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Abstract:
Transparency has become one of the key features of monetary
policy. This paper analyzes the reputational incentives related to
transparency, focusing on the publication of central bank forecasts.
A simple dynamic monetary policy game shows how transparency
reduces inflation, as has been found empirically. Although trans-
parency exposes weak central banks, the negative market feedback
in response to secrecy could provide a sufficiently strong induce-
ment to become transparent. Thus, reputational concerns could lead
to transparency, even without formal disclosure requirements. Key-
words: transparency, monetary policy, central bank forecasts.
JEL codes: D82, E42, E52, E58.
Transparency and Reputation:
The Publication of Central Bank Forecasts1
Petra M. Geraats2
1 Introduction
Transparency has become one of the key features of monetary
policy. A comprehensive survey of 94 central banks by Fry, Julius,
Mahadeva, Roger and Sterne (2000) reveals that 74% of central
banks consider transparency a vital or very important component
of their monetary policy framework, and that 78% publish forward-
looking analysis. This paper analyzes the reputational incentives
associated with transparency, focusing on the publication of central
bank forecasts. It predicts a negative relation between transparency
and inflation, as has been found empirically. In addition, it helps
to explain why transparency (in monetary policy, but also in other
contexts) often goes beyond formal disclosure requirements.
More precisely, the paper shows how transparency about eco-
nomic forecasts improves the central bank’s incentive to build rep-
utation. Intuitively, the interest rate set by the central bank reflects
both it inflationary intentions and the economic shocks it antici-
pates. Under transparency, people observe the central bank’s eco-
nomic forecasts, so the interest rate provides a more accurate signal
of the central bank’s intentions. This makes the expectations of the
public more responsive to the central bank’s attempt to build repu-
tation through higher interest rates. So, transparency improves the
central bank’s ability to gain and maintain reputation. In addition,
since the market pays more attention to the signals from transparent
1This paper is an abridged version of my job market paper (Geraats 2000), which benefitted
from discussions with numerous people and was presented at a dozen seminars and conferences.
I extend special thanks to my dissertation advisors, Maury Obstfeld, David Romer and Rich
Lyons, for valuable comments.
2Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, CB3 9DD, United Kingdom.
Email: Petra.Geraats@econ.cam.ac.uk
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central banks, they invest more in reputation. This leads to a lower
inflation bias, which is socially beneficial.
Nevertheless, a weak, inflationary central bank prefers opacity
about its forecasts because it obscures its true intent. However,
when the choice of transparency is endogenous, secrecy is asso-
ciated with weakness and harms a central bank’s reputation. This
negative market feedback could be sufficient to induce all central
banks to adopt transparency. This mechanism applies more gener-
ally and is useful to understand how (international) financial mar-
kets could impose transparency in other contexts.
The model in this paper is in the tradition of the discretionary
monetary policy games first described by Kydland and Prescott
(1977) and later formalized by Barro and Gordon (1983). It is
a simple two-period model in which there is some uncertainty
about the central bank’s preferences and the central bank has a
motive to stimulate output beyond the natural rate. In contrast
to most previous models, there is a real interest rate transmission
mechanism, so the nominal interest rate acts as both the policy
instrument and a signal of the central bank’s intentions. In addition,
there is an explicit distinction between a regime of opacity and
transparency. The latter corresponds to the publication of central
bank forecasts, which reveals the economic disturbances to which
policymakers respond and allows the public to infer the central
bank’s intentions from the policy instrument.
In a more general context, transparency refers to the absence
of information asymmetries. This paper builds on insights from
information economics (see Stiglitz (2000) for a recent overview)
and contributes to the literature on transparency of monetary policy
by incorporating both a reputation and a self-selection/signaling
effect.
First, transparency affects the central bank’s incentive to build
reputation. There is rational updating of the central bank’s type
based on observable policy actions, similar to Backus and Driffill
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(1985), Barro (1986) and Cukierman and Meltzer (1986). The
result that transparency leads to greater sensitivity of inflation
expectations and reduces the inflation bias is common to Faust and
Svensson (2001) and Jensen (2002, 2000). However, they consider
inference based on policy outcomes (complicated by unanticipated
monetary control errors), whereas the present paper focuses on the
private sector response to policy actions (which reflect anticipated
economic shocks). This is motivated by the fact that interest
rate decisions are scrutinized by the market for clues about future
monetary policy. In addition, it helps to explain why central banks
tend to publish forecasts for both inflation and output, which is
puzzling in light of the literature on inflation-forecast targeting (e.g.
Svensson 1997).
Second, a novel effect analyzed in this paper is that the choice
of transparency gives rise to signaling and self-selection. When the
transparency regime is endogenous, the public rationally expects
opaque central banks to be more inflationary, which harms their
reputation and leads to higher inflation expectations. The result that
market discipline could lead to transparency because of reputational
concerns is shown to hold for a reduced-form payoff function that
is more widely applicable.
The burgeoning theoretical literature on transparency of mone-
tary policy has obtained a variety of findings, depending on the as-
sumptions of the model and the particular information asymmetry
under consideration. A comprehensive survey is provided by Ger-
aats (2002). The present paper is about ‘economic transparency’,
the disclosure of the economic information that is used for policy
decisions, in particular central bank forecasts. Tarkka and Mayes
(1999) argue that the publication of central bank forecasts could re-
duce (mutual) uncertainty about expectations and lead to greater
predictability of monetary policy. On the other hand, Gersbach
(1998), Cukierman (2001) and Jensen (2000) show that transparency
about economic disturbances could hamper stabilization policy when
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the disclosure of shocks leads to an adjustment of inflation ex-
pectations that negatively affects the current output-inflation trade-
off. Jensen (2000) adopts a new-Keynesian Phillips curve, whereas
Gersbach (1998) and Cukierman (2001) use a neo-monetarist Lucas-
type transmission mechanism in which (central bank forecasts of)
economic disturbances are observed before private sector inflation
expectations are fixed.
In contrast to Gersbach (1998) and Cukierman (2001), the
present paper assumes that there is some preference uncertainty
which gives rise to a beneficial incentive effect of transparency
that reduces the inflation bias. A similar result is found by
Faust and Svensson (2001) and Jensen (2002) who focus on a
different kind of transparency, the disclosure of information on
monetary control errors. Although Faust and Svensson (2001)
find that increased transparency of control errors tends to improve
social welfare, Faust and Svensson (2002) argue that minimum
transparency is a likely outcome in practice when the regime is
endogenous. However, they do not consider self-selection effects,
which could provide a powerful incentive for central banks to adopt
transparency.
The analysis in this paper relies on three important presump-
tions. First, there is uncertainty about the central bank’s intentions.
For analytical convenience this is modeled as uncertainty about the
inflation target. Although many central banks have announced ex-
plicit inflation targets, these are often formulated as ranges. More-
over, they need not be perfectly credible. Bernanke, Laubach, Mishkin
and Posen (1999) provide anecdotal support for this by showing
that explicit inflation targets affect inflation expectations only grad-
ually. In fact, there is always likely to be some uncertainty about the
central bank’s intentions because they cannot be directly observed
and may change over time.
Second, it is assumed that there is asymmetric information
about economic disturbances. Romer and Romer (2000) present
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empirical evidence for this. They show that confidential Federal
Reserve forecasts of inflation are superior to commercial forecasts,
even at a short horizon of one or two quarters ahead. This suggests
that the central bank has private information about economic
disturbances. This could be due to confidential information not
available to the private sector, like bank supervisory data (Peek,
Rosengren and Tootell 1999), or the economic analysis by central
bank staff. Although the present model assumes that the central
bank has more accurate information, the conclusions even hold
when the private sector is merely unsure of the central bank’s
forecasts of economic shocks.
Finally, it is assumed that central bank forecasts are truthful
and that people are able to interpret them correctly. Instead,
Winkler (2002) argues that effective communication is not trivial;
he proposes to view transparency in terms of openness, clarity,
honesty and common understanding. In addition, Garfinkel and
Oh (1995) assume that central bank forecasts cannot be verified
and show how a central bank could partially reveal its private
information through noisy announcements. The present paper
adopts the approach proposed by Goodfriend (1986, p. 86) and
assumes that the data collection, modeling and forecasting activities
performed by central bank staff are delegated to an independent
agency that reports to both monetary policymakers and the public
in the case of transparency. Thus, the forecasts are in principle
verifiable.
An alternative to transparency that reduces the inflation bias would
be the implementation of an instrument rule that incorporates the
central bank’s information on economic disturbances. However,
central banks appear extremely reluctant to adopt instrument rules.
One reason is that rules do not allow a central bank to respond to
unforeseen contingencies or changes in the structure of the econ-
omy. Instead, many central banks appear to conduct discretionary
policy under transparency, which yields a lower inflation bias with-
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out giving up control.
The next section presents the model, which is analyzed first for
an exogenous regime of transparency and opacity in section 3, and
subsequently for the endogenous choice of regime in section 4. The
robustness of the results and empirical evidence are discussed in
section 5, and section 6 concludes.
2 Model
The central banker is in office for two periods and maximizes the
expected value of the objective function
U =W1 + δW2, (1)
where δ is the subjective discount factor (0 < δ < 1), and
Wt = −
1
2
(πt − τ)2 + β (yt − y¯) , (2)
where πt is inflation; yt is the level of aggregate real output; τ is the
implicit inflation target, drawn from the (nondegenerate) normal
distribution: τ ∼ N
¡
τ¯ ,σ2τ
¢
with σ2τ > 0; y¯ equals the natural rate of
output; β is the relative weight on output stimulation (β > 0); and
the subscript t denotes the time period, t ∈ {1, 2}. The economy is
described by two equations. Aggregate demand is given by the IS
relationship
yt = y¯ − (it − πet − r¯) + dt, (3)
where it is the nominal interest rate; πet denotes the market’s
inflation expectations; r¯ is the long-run, ex ante real interest rate;
and, dt is a white noise demand shock: dt ∼ N
¡
0,σ2d
¢
with σ2d > 0.
Aggregate supply is given by the price adjustment equation
πt = πet + (yt − y¯)− st, (4)
where st is a white noise supply shock: st ∼ N
¡
0,σ2s
¢
with σ2s > 0.
For analytical convenience, it is assumed that st, dt and τ are
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independent. Without loss of generality, the slopes of the aggregate
demand and supply relations (3) and (4) are normalized to one.
The monetary policy instrument is the nominal interest rate it,
following the actual practice of most central banks. The public fixes
its inflation expectations πet , so the central bank is able to influence
the ex ante real interest rate it − πet . As a result, monetary policy
has real effects. Inflation can be indirectly controlled through the
output gap yt − y¯.
The timing is as follows. Before the first period, the inflation
target τ is drawn, but only known to the central bank. Subsequently,
the central bank chooses a regime of transparency (T ) or opacity
(O) about the economic shocks dt and st that the central bank
responds to. The public perceives the chosen regime and forms
its inflation expectations πe1. In the beginning of the first period,
the economic disturbances d1 and s1 are realized. The central bank
observes πe1, d1 and s1, and subsequently sets the nominal interest
rate i1.3 At the end of the first period, the public forms inflation
expectations πe2, using the interest rate i1 (and under transparency,
d1 and s1) to update its prior on τ . At the beginning of the second
period, inflation π1 and output y1 are observed and the shocks d2
and s2 are realized. The central bank perceives πe2, d2 and s2, and
determines the interest rate i2. After this last period, inflation π2
and output y2 are observed.
The model features asymmetric information. The public is un-
certain about the central bank’s inflation target τ . In addition, it
does not know the shocks dt and st when it forms its inflation expec-
tations πet . It is assumed that the public has rational expectations.
Formally, the information set available to the public when it forms
its inflation expectations πe1 equals ΩR0 ≡ {R,β, y¯, r¯, τ¯ ,σ2τ ,σ2d,σ2s}
under transparency (R = T ) and opacity (R = O). When the pub-
lic forms its inflation expectations πe2, the available information set
3For simplicity, the model assumes that the central bank is able to forecast the economic
shocks dt and st perfectly. It is straightforward to extend the model to allow for forecast errors,
but this does not affect any of the qualitative results.
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equals {i1,ΩR1 }, where ΩT1 ≡
©
d1, s1,ΩT0
ª
under transparency and
ΩO1 ≡ ΩO0 under opacity. Comparing transparency with opacity, the
only difference is that in the case of transparency the public ob-
serves the economic disturbances to which the central bank reacts.
The public uses the interest rate i1 to infer the central bank’s
inflation target τ . It is assumed that inflation π1 and output y1 are not
observed until after inflation expectations πe2 are formed because of
lags in monetary policy transmission. This captures the fact that
in practice, changes in the policy instrument only have an effect
on macroeconomic outcomes after a substantial delay. Meanwhile,
people adjust their expectations based on the policy instrument,
which sets the stage for the next policy decision.
The model is solved in two steps. In section 3, the transparency
regime is assumed to be exogenous. In section 4, the choice of
regime is endogenous.
3 Exogenous Regime
The case of an exogenous transparency regime is interesting in
itself because central banks tend to be subject to some legislative
disclosure requirements. Exogeneity of the regime precludes self-
selection, so it is assumed that the public’s prior on the inflation
target is τ¯ under both transparency and opacity.
The problem can be solved by backwards induction. In period
two, the central bank maximizesW2 with respect to i2 subject to (4)
and (3), and given πe2, d2 and s2. The first order condition implies
i2 = r¯ + πe2 − (τ + β − πe2) + d2 − s2. (5)
The nominal interest rate i2 (and the ex ante real interest rate
i2 − πe2) is increasing in the market’s inflation expectations πe2
and the demand shock d2, but decreasing in the supply shock s2.
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Substituting (5) into (3) and (4) yields
y2 = y¯ + (τ + β − πe2) + s2 (6)
π2 = τ + β. (7)
Output y2 is decreasing in inflation expectations πe2 and increasing
in the output supply shock s2. The demand shock d2 is completely
offset by monetary policy. Since the objective function is linear in
output, the supply shock s2 does not influence the level of inflation
π2 and there is an inflationary bias (π2 > τ) of discretionary
monetary policy. Substituting (7) and (6) into (2) gives
W2 =
1
2
β2 + β (τ − πe2) + βs2. (8)
This shows that the central bank benefits from lower inflation
expectations πe2. Thus, it has an incentive to improve its reputation
through its actions in period one.
In the first period, the central bank uses (2) and (8) to maximize
the expected value of its objective function (1) with respect to
i1 subject to (4) and (3), and given πe1, d1 and s1. But now it
also takes into account the effect of i1 on W2 through πe2, because
the private sector updates its inflation expectations πe2 using the
policy instrument i1. This is the crucial mechanism that generates
reputation effects. It is assumed that people use the following
updating rule, which is shown to be consistent with a rational
expectations equilibrium in sections 3.1 and 3.2:4
πe2 = u+ vi1. (9)
The first order condition with respect to i1 implies
i1 = r¯ + πe1 − (τ + β − πe1) + d1 − s1 − δβv. (10)
This expression for the nominal interest rate is similar to the one for
the second period in (5), except for the last term on the right-hand
4Existence of a rational expectations equilibrium is no problem in this model. This is in
contrast to Bernanke and Woodford (1997) where the central bank uses private sector inflation
forecasts to infer information about economic disturbances.
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side. This term reflects the reputation effect of the interest rate on
inflation expectations in the next period.
To proceed it is necessary to distinguish between the regimes of
transparency and opacity.
3.1 Transparency
In this paper, transparency refers to the publication of central bank
forecasts, which provides information on the economic disturbances
dt and st that affect the central bank’s behavior. Thus, people are
able to infer the central bank’s intentions from its actions. It is
useful to make a distinction between conditional forecasts that are
based on an explicit level (or path) of the interest rate, and uncon-
ditional forecasts, which constitute the best estimate given the in-
formation that is available but are based on an anticipated interest
rate (path) that is not specified.
To see how the publication of conditional central bank forecasts
contributes to economic transparency, let iC denote the interest rate
that is used for the conditional forecast. Then the public can use
the conditional central bank forecast for output yCt , its inflation
expectations πet and (3) to deduce (the central bank’s forecast of)
the demand shock dt. Similarly, (the central bank’s forecast of) the
supply shock st follows from the conditional central bank forecast
for inflation πCt , yCt , πet and (4). Note that it is generally necessary to
disclose forecasts for both output and inflation to identify demand
and supply shocks. In contrast to the literature on inflation forecast
targeting pioneered by Svensson (1997), output forecasts play an
important role for transparency. This may explain why central
banks tend to publish inflation as well as output forecasts.
Perhaps surprisingly, the publication of unconditional forecasts
does not necessarily have the same effect as that of conditional
forecasts, an issue which is briefly discussed in section 3.3. For
the rest of the paper, (economic) transparency corresponds to the
publication of conditional central bank forecasts.
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Under a regime of transparency, indicated by superscript T , the
public knows i1, d1 and s1 when it forms its inflation expectations
πe2. It can therefore infer the inflation target τ (ex post) from the
interest rate i1 using (10). Rational expectations and (7) then imply
(πe2)
T = ET1 [π2|i1] = τ + β, (11)
where moment operators with subscript t ∈ {0, 1} and superscripts
R ∈ {T,O} are conditional on the information set ΩRt . Substituting
(11) into (5), (6) and (7) gives the interest rate, output and inflation
in the second period:
iT2 = r¯ + τ + β + d2 − s2 (12)
yT2 = y¯ + s2 (13)
πT2 = τ + β. (14)
To get the outcomes in the first period, the reputation coefficient
v must be computed. Under transparency, solving (10) for τ ,
substituting into (11) and matching coefficients with (9) yields5,6
vT = −1. (15)
Thus, it is established that this is indeed a rational expectations
equilibrium.7 The negative value of vT indicates that the central
bank can invest in reputation by increasing the nominal interest rate
i1 to reduce inflation expectations πe2. The first-period outcomes
are obtained by substituting (15) into (10), using (3) and (4), and
imposing rational expectations, (πe1)
T = ET0 [π1]. This produces
iT1 = r¯ + E
T
0 [τ ]−
³
τ − ET0 [τ ]
´
+ (1− δ)β + d1 − s1 (16)
yT1 = y¯ +
³
τ − ET0 [τ ]
´
+ s1 (17)
πT1 = τ + (1− δ)β. (18)
5For completeness, uT = r¯ + 2 (πe1)
T + δβ + d1 − s1
6Note that (11) may give the impression that vT = 0 is also a solution. However, τ is not
directly observable; it can only be inferred indirectly from i1, d1 and s1. As a result, πe2 does
depend on i1.
7Multiple rational expectations equilibria may exist. However, this is the only one that
satisfies the McCallum (1983) criterion to employ a minimal set of state variables in the
updating equation.
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The first period is different from the second period for two reasons.
First, expectations of the inflation target τ are updated. In the
first period, the uncertainty about the central bank’s inflation target
makes the level of output yT1 dependent on the central bank’s type
τ , because a higher inflation target reduces the interest rate and
thereby raises output. But in the second period, transparency has
allowed the public to infer the inflation target, so output yT2 no
longer depends on the central bank’s type τ as ET1 [τ ] = τ .
The second difference is the reputation effect that decreases both
the nominal interest rate and inflation in period one. The effect on
the interest rate may seem counter-intuitive. However, for a given
level of inflation expectations πe1, the central bank chooses a higher
(nominal and ex ante real) interest rate, and thereby lower output
and lower inflation, in period one to reduce inflation expectations in
period two. The lower level of inflation in period one is anticipated
and reduces inflation expectations πe1. This decreases the (nominal
and ex ante real) interest rate. Rational expectations ensure that the
negative effect on output in period one is completely offset, so there
is no net effect on the ex ante real interest rate. As a result, lower
inflation expectations give rise to a lower nominal interest rate in
period one. The effect of reputation on inflation is more familiar.
Although the ex ante real interest rate is the same, the lower level
of inflation expectations πe1 reduces the level of inflation, partly
eliminating the inflationary bias of discretionary monetary policy:
τ < πT1 < πT2 .
Substituting (11) into (8), and using (18) and (17), the expected
payoff to the central bank in the case of transparency equals
ET0 [U |τ ] = −
h
(1− δ)2 + δ
i 1
2
β2 + β
³
τ − ET0 [τ ]
´
. (19)
It shows that the central bank’s expected payoff is decreasing in the
inflation target expected by the public, ET0 [τ ], which is important
for the self-selection effect when the regime is endogenous.
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3.2 Opacity
To appreciate the benefits of transparency it is important to look at
the case of opacity as well. Under a regime of opacity, indicated
by superscript O, the public updates its prior on the inflation
target τ from the policy instrument i1, although it is no longer
able to perfectly infer the central bank’s intentions. Use rational
expectations, (7), (10) and the fact that i1 and πe2 are jointly
normally distributed because of their common dependence on τ ,
to get
(πe2)
O = E
O
1 [π2|i1] = EO1 [τ ]+
CovO1 {τ , i1}
VarO1 [i1]
³
iO1 − EO1 [i1]
´
+β. (20)
Matching coefficients between (20) and (9) yields8
vO = − σ
2
τ
σ2τ + σ2d + σ2s
≡ −λ, (21)
where λ can be interpreted as a signal-to-noise ratio. Note that
0 < λ < 1, so
¯¯
vO
¯¯
<
¯¯
vT
¯¯
. A lower interest rate has a smaller
effect on πe2 under opacity because people cannot tell whether it
reflects a weak central bank (high τ), or either a negative demand
shock (low d1) or positive supply shock (high s1). The signal i1 is
noisier so the optimal response to it is smaller. In the limiting case¡
σ2d + σ
2
s
¢
→ 0, it follows that λ → 1; the absence of uncertainty
about the disturbances d1 and s1 in period two gives the same
outcome for v as under transparency.9
Using (10), (20) amounts to
(πe2)
O = τ + β − (1− λ)
³
τ − EO1 [τ ]
´
− λ (d1 − s1) . (22)
This shows that a positive net demand shock has a beneficial effect
on reputation under opacity, because rational agents partly attribute
8For completeness, uO = λ
³
r¯ + 2 (πe1)
O + λδβ
´
+ (1− λ)
¡
EO0 [τ ] + β
¢
.
9Notice that λ → 1 is not sufficient to get uO = uT , and thereby (πe2)
O = (πe2)
T , because
of a difference in the information sets at the end of the first period. In particular, uO depends
on EO1 [d1] = EO1 [s1] = 0, whereas uT depends on ET1 [d1] = d1 and ET1 [s1] = s1.
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the rise in interest rates to a low inflation target τ and reduce their
inflation expectations accordingly. In addition, the central bank
enjoys lower inflation expectations πe2 when its inflation target is
higher than expected, because the public believes that the lower
level of interest rates is due to negative net demand shocks instead.
The first-period outcomes are obtained by substituting (21) into
(10), using (3) and (4), and imposing rational expectations, (πe1)
O =
EO0 [π1]. This produces
iO1 = r¯ + E
O
0 [τ ]−
³
τ − EO0 [τ ]
´
+ (1− λδ)β + d1 − s1 (23)
yO1 = y¯ +
³
τ − EO0 [τ ]
´
+ s1 (24)
πO1 = τ + (1− λδ)β. (25)
These expressions are similar to those under transparency, (16),
(17) and (18), except that under opacity the discount factor is
effectively reduced from δ to λδ. To facilitate comparison, use
the fact that EO0 [τ ] = ET0 [τ ] because the regime is exogenous and
independent of the central bank’s type. Then, the nominal interest
rate in period one is higher than under transparency (iO1 > iT1 ), but
monetary policy is more expansionary in the sense that it leads to
higher inflation (πO1 > πT1 ). These results can be reconciled by
realizing that the level of inflation expectations πe1 is higher under
opacity. For given initial inflation expectations, (πe1)
T = (πe1)
O,
the nominal (and ex ante real) interest rate is lower (iO1 < iT1 )
and output is higher (yO1 > yT1 ) under opacity. The reason is
that higher interest rates do not reduce inflation expectations πe2 as
much under opacity because the signal is considered noisier. So,
the reputation effect v of higher interest rates is diminished under
opacity, giving rise to more expansionary monetary policy. People
anticipate the higher level of inflation so that (πe1)
O > (πe1)
T . Thus,
the central bank sets a higher level of the first-period (nominal
and ex ante real) interest rate under opacity to contain inflation.
Rational expectations ensure that the levels of output are constant
across the regimes, so the ex ante real interest rates are the same
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in both cases. Consequently, opacity brings about a higher first-
period nominal interest rate. Although the ex ante real interest rate
is the same in both cases, the higher level of inflation expectations
exerts its influence. As a result, opacity leads to higher first-period
inflation than transparency: τ < πT1 < πO1 < πT2 = πO2 .10
It appears that the adoption of transparency affects the strategic
incentives of the central bank and makes investment in reputation
more fruitful. It allows the public to identify the central bank’s
efforts to stabilize economic shocks, which produces a more
accurate signal of the central bank’s type and makes the public’s
expectations more responsive. Thus, transparency makes it more
enticing for the central bank to invest in reputation, which results
in a lower inflation bias than under opacity.
The size of the inflation bias under opacity is decreasing in the
signal-to-noise ratio λ. A reduction in the variance of economic
shocks, σ2d and σ2s, increases λ by diminishing the severity of
opaqueness, so it makes the inflation bias smaller. However,
a reduction in the ex ante uncertainty about the central bank’s
inflation target σ2τ decreases the signal-to-noise ratio λ and thereby
increases the inflation bias. So, greater preference transparency
actually makes a situation of economic opacity worse. As a result, a
central bank that enjoys higher credibility (lower σ2τ ) has even more
to gain from economic transparency. Intuitively, when the public
faces less uncertainty about the central bank’s type, it pays less
attention to the interest rate, which reduces the payoff of investing
in reputation and leads to a higher inflation bias under economic
opacity.11
To complete the analysis of opacity, substitute (22) into (8), and
10The result that opacity increases the inflation bias is very robust. A sufficient condition is
that vT < vO and it is independent of the way inflation expectations are formed.
11This result is in sharp contrast to Walsh (1999) who shows that an explicit inflation target
reduces the inflation bias when deviations from the target are considered costly.
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use (25) and (24) to get the expected payoff for the central bank
EO0 [U |τ ] = −
h
(1− λδ)2 + δ
i 1
2
β2 + (1 + (1− λ) δ)β
³
τ − EO0 [τ ]
´
.
(26)
Again, the expected payoff is decreasing in the expected inflation
target EO0 [τ ].
3.3 Comparison
The analysis of opacity above shows that inflation is lower under
transparency (πT1 < πO1 ) but independent of economic shocks in
both cases, and that the expected value of output conditional on
the regime is equal (ET0
£
yT1
¤
= EO0
£
yO1
¤
). This suggests that the
public would prefer transparency. For simplicity, assume that the
public shares the central bank’s objective function. So, there is
no principal-agent problem and (2) can be interpreted as a social
welfare function. Using (19) and (26), the expected payoffs for the
public, which is ignorant of the central bank’s inflation target τ ,
equal
E
T
0 [U ] = −
h
(1− δ)2 + δ
i 1
2
β2
EO0 [U ] = −
h
(1− λδ)2 + δ
i 1
2
β2.
Since ET0 [U ] > EO0 [U ], it follows that the public always prefers
transparency.12
However, central banks do not necessarily agree with the de-
sirability of transparency. With an exogenous regime, ET0 [τ ] =
EO0 [τ ] = τ¯ , so (19) and (26) imply that ET0 [U |τ ] > EO0 [U |τ ] if and
only if (2− (1 + λ) δ) 12β > τ − τ¯ . Strong central banks with low
inflation targets would be happy to publish their forecasts, whereas
weak central banks with sufficiently high inflation targets would
rather be enveloped by secrecy. This suggests that if central banks
12This conclusion even holds for the more general social welfare function WSt =
−12 (πt − τ¯)
2 − 12β
S (yt − y¯) and US =WS1 + δSWS2 , where βS > 0 and 0 < δS < 1.
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could choose the regime themselves, strong central banks would
have a greater incentive to adopt openness. Endogeneity of the
regime is discussed in the next section.
Before continuing, recall that the analysis has focused on the
publication of conditional forecasts, which are based on the as-
sumption of a given level of the interest rate. However, the dis-
closure of unconditional forecasts, which incorporate anticipated
changes in the policy instrument, need not have the same effect. In
fact, releasing the unconditional forecast for inflation leads to the
worst possible outcome.
To understand this it is important to realize that the release
of conditional central bank forecasts both reduces the uncertainty
about the central bank’s inflation target τ , and gives the central bank
better incentives to invest in reputation since market expectations
are more sensitive to the interest rate. The publication of the
unconditional inflation forecast also reduces uncertainty because it
directly reveals the inflation target. But, the public does not need
the interest rate i1 to infer τ , so that the behavioral incentive is
absent. As a result, there is no reduction in the inflation bias.13
So, the publication of unconditional central bank forecasts could
give rise to the full inflation bias. This suggests that it may be
desirable to publish conditional forecasts that are based on an
explicit interest rate (path) to guarantee the beneficial incentive
effects of transparency.14
4 Endogenous Regime
So far, the analysis was for an exogenous regime of transparency
or opacity. However, the regime need not be imposed by the
13Formally, (10), (3) and (4) give the unconditional central bank forecast for inflation,
πU1 = τ + (1 + vδ)β. Since E
£
τ |πU1
¤
= τ , it follows that v = 0 so that π1 = τ + β. In
contrast, πC1 does not depend on τ as it is not based on the optimizing i1.
14Tarkka and Mayes (1999) favor the publication of unconditional forecasts. But there is no
inflation bias in their model, so behavioral incentives are immaterial.
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government but could be chosen by the central bank itself. In
fact, central bank transparency in practice typically exceeds formal
disclosure requirements. The previous section shows that the
regime preferred by the central bank depends on its inflation target
τ . In particular, strong central banks favor transparency, whereas
weaker types like opacity. But when central banks choose their own
regime, the market realizes this and adjusts its beliefs accordingly,
so that typically ET0 [τ ] < EO0 [τ ]. Thus, there is a signaling effect
associated with the transparency regime. Since (19) and (26) reveal
that the expected payoff to the central bank is decreasing in the
expected inflation target ER0 [τ ], the adjustment of private sector
expectations due to the signaling effect makes transparency more
desirable and opacity more onerous. In fact, this market feedback
from the choice of regime could be so strong that all types of central
banks opt for transparency.
The analysis of the model with an endogenous regime is compli-
cated by the fact that outcomes may arise (on or off the equilibrium
path) in which not all central bank types select the same regime.
This makes the model nonlinear and closed-form solutions for the
outcomes under opacity no longer exist. As a result, the linear
updating equation (20) no longer holds under opacity. However,
it is still possible to tackle the model analytically by substituting
∂ EO1 [πe2|i1] /∂i1 for vO. Appendix A contains the formal analysis of
the model with an endogenous regime.
The central bank chooses the regime that produces the highest
expected payoff subject to the equilibrium condition that for all
central bank types, the market’s expectations ER0 [τ ] are consistent
with the regime choices that follow from those expectations. When
the market’s beliefs off the equilibrium path are also restricted
to be rational, transparency is the unique pure-strategy perfect
equilibrium.15 The proof of this result appears in appendix A.
15Without this restriction, no pure-strategy perfect equilibrium exists. Mixed equilibria, in
which some central bank types randomize between transparency and opaqueness, are possible
but not considered here.
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Intuitively, weak central banks with high inflation targets are
inclined to select opacity, because it obscures their true type.
But the market realizes that opacity signals high inflation targets,
so it harms the central bank’s reputation as it increases EO0 [τ ].
The corresponding rise in inflation expectations penalizes opaque
central banks, which therefore have a greater incentive to be
transparent. This causes opaque central banks with the lowest
inflation targets τ to switch to transparency, which means that the
remaining opaque central banks face an even stronger inducement
to adopt transparency. In the end, market discipline suffices to make
every central bank transparent when the regime is endogenous. It
should be noted, however, that this conclusion is quite sensitive to
the assumptions.
5 Discussion
The analysis above shows that transparency in the form of publi-
cation of central bank forecasts reduces the inflation bias and that
market feedback can induce transparency when the regime is en-
dogenous. This section assesses the robustness of these results and
discusses empirical evidence.
The result that greater economic transparency makes inflation
expectations more sensitive to policy actions and reduces the
inflation bias is very robust. It also holds for a neo-monetarist
or new-Keynesian transmission mechanism and also applies to
the commonly used objective function Wt = −12α (πt − π∗)
2 −
1
2 (yt − y∗)
2, where y∗ > y¯. In addition, the beneficial effect of
disclosure of central bank forecasts extends to information about
the structure of the economy. Suppose the public is not sure about
the level of the long-run real interest rate r¯. This makes the nominal
interest rate a noisier signal of the central bank’s intentions. As a
result, inflation expectations become less sensitive to the nominal
interest rate which reduces the reputation effect that limits the
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inflation bias.16,17
Furthermore, the reputation mechanism formalized in this paper,
namely inference based on policy actions, remains relevant for
longer horizons when central bank preferences are subject to
change, for instance due to new appointments to the monetary
policy committee. This means that the beneficial incentive effects
found in the two-period model persist over time. In addition, as
people gradually learn more about the central bank as time passes,
the reduction in preference uncertainty only increases the benefits
of transparency about forecasts. As a result, the conclusions are
likely to generalize albeit at the cost of analytical tractability,
similar to Faust and Svensson (2001) who focus on transparency
about control errors and have to resort to simulations to solve their
infinite horizon model.
There is anecdotal support for the relevance of the argument that
the publication of central bank forecasts has a beneficial incentive
effect. For instance, the Bank of England started publishing its
forecasts in Inflation Reports in 1993, when monetary policy was
still basically set by the Chancellor of the Exchequer. According to
King (1997, p. 440), the current Governor of the Bank of England,
“The original objective of the Inflation Report was, it is
fair to say, to act as a disciplining device on Government.
The Bank’s report would set out its views of the likely
implications for inflation of decisions taken (or not taken)
by the Chancellor.”
After an earlier version of the present paper (Geraats 2000) was
16More precisely, assume that r¯ ∼ N
¡
ρ,σ2ρ
¢
, independently of τ , εst and εdt . Then,
vO = −σ2τ/
¡
σ2ρ + σ2τ + σ2d + σ2s
¢
≡ −λr so that greater uncertainty about the natural real
interest rate (σ2ρ) reduces λr and increases the inflation bias.
17Model uncertainty could complicate the interpretation of central bank forecasts. For
instance, if the public does not know the natural rate of output y¯, it may be unable to infer
the economic shocks dt and st from the forecasts of output and inflation. In that case, central
bank forecasts need to be supplemented by the central bank’s estimate of the natural rate of
output to achieve transparency. Such opaqueness about economic models may be due to lack
of professional consensus (Cukierman 2002).
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circulated, formal empirical evidence on the relation between the
disclosure of central bank forecasts and the level of inflation has
been presented by Chortareas, Stasavage and Sterne (2002). They
use the central bank survey by Fry et al. (2000) to construct a trans-
parency index for 87 countries based on the extent to which cen-
tral banks publish forecasts. They find that greater transparency re-
duces average inflation, even after controlling for macroeconomic
features, like openness and per capita output, and institutional char-
acteristics, including political instability and central bank indepen-
dence. The negative relationship between transparency and infla-
tion holds for inflation and monetary targeting frameworks, but not
for countries that have abandoned control over monetary policy by
adopting an exchange rate peg. This is consistent with the predic-
tion of the present paper that the publication of central bank fore-
casts improves the incentives for the central bank to reduce the in-
flation bias.
The result that an endogenous choice of regime leads to trans-
parency is less robust and hinges on several assumptions. First, it
requires that the central bank’s objective function is linear in output,
so that prior expectations ER0 [τ ] enter linearly. Second, it relies on
the strong assumption of rationality of market expectations both on
and off the equilibrium path. If the public uses Bayesian updating
to form its expectations, a situation of secrecy could persist and un-
ravel to the transparency equilibrium only gradually.18 Third, there
could be bureaucratic or political motives for obfuscation. Like any
bureaucracy, central banks may have incentives to hide mistakes or
embarrassing forecasts, or to cherish the information rents that se-
crecy brings, like extensive media attention (see Stiglitz 1999). Or,
central bankers may simply find it burdensome to substantiate their
decisions. In addition, a central bank that lacks operational inde-
18Interestingly, the wave of central bank transparency that has emerged over the last two
decades began in New Zealand in 1989, which made its central bank subject to a contract (Policy
Targets Agreement) and disclosure requirements (Monetary Policy Statements). Its success may
have started the Bayesian updating process and triggered greater transparency elsewhere.
21
pendence or a clear political mandate may envelop itself in secrecy
to obtain insulation from political pressures (Geraats 2001). Thus,
the movement towards central bank independence during the last
few decades may have contributed to the endogenous adoption of
transparency by central banks.
A striking feature of the result that the negative market feedback
in response to secrecy could induce transparency is that it applies
more widely: It holds for any problem in which the expected
payoff of an agency of unobservable type τ equals ER [U |τ ] =
AR
¡
τ − ER [τ ]
¢
+BR, where 0 < AT < AO, BO ≤ BT , and τ has a
normal distribution. Intuitively, the restrictions on the coefficients
imply that with transparency, the agency benefits less if its type is
different from the market’s expectation, and that transparency is not
worse than opacity ex ante.
The finding that reputational concerns could provide a sufficiently
strong incentive to achieve information disclosure may be useful
in other contexts. For instance, the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) has established “Codes of Good Practices on Transparency”
in monetary, financial and fiscal policies, but does not enforce im-
plementation. Instead, it appears to rely on the hope that lack of ad-
herence is penalized by international financial markets so that coun-
tries adopt these standards ‘voluntarily’. This paper suggests that
reliance on market discipline could indeed enforce transparency
(or other international standards). However, if market expectations
are not rational off the equilibrium path but instead are determined
through Bayesian updating, then a situation of secrecy could pre-
vail for a long time and a stimulus may be required before market
feedback starts operating.19 A further analysis of these interesting
issues is beyond the scope of this paper and left for future research.
Last but not least, there are other effects of transparency besides
reputational incentives. For instance, it could affect the stabiliza-
19The IMF assesses compliance in its “Reports on Observance of Standards and Codes”
which are typically published on its web site (http://www.imf.org). This policy of ‘naming
and shaming’ could speed up the process of market enforcement.
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tion of economic shocks, which need not be beneficial. A further
discussion is provided in the survey paper on central bank trans-
parency by Geraats (2002). It shows that the theoretical literature is
by no means unequivocal about the benefits of transparency, which
may explain why there is still considerable variation in the degree
of transparency of monetary policy in practice.
6 Conclusion
Transparency has become a key feature of monetary policy and
most central banks have adopted the practice of publishing forward
looking analysis. This paper analyzes the reputational effects re-
lated to transparency of monetary policy, focusing on the publi-
cation of central bank forecasts. It shows how such transparency
enhances the central bank’s ability to build reputation and reduces
the inflationary bias of discretionary monetary policy. This may
explain why the trendsetters in transparency, the Reserve Bank of
New Zealand and the Bank of England, had histories of relatively
high inflation. It also shows the importance of transparency for a
young central bank, like the European Central Bank. Moreover, the
finding that publication of forecasts reduces inflation is consistent
with cross-section empirical evidence.
The paper shows that central banks with inflationary preferences
are reluctant to adopt transparency since it reveals their true
intents. However, when the choice of transparency is endogenous,
secrecy signals an inflationary central bank and the public rationally
increases its inflation expectations. This harmful effect on the
reputation of the central bank makes secrecy less attractive and
could provide a sufficient incentive to choose transparency. Such
reputational concerns induced by market discipline apply more
widely and help to explain why transparency often goes beyond
formal disclosure requirements.
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A Appendix: Endogenous Regime
This Appendix formally analyzes the model when the transparency
regime is endogenous. It proves that transparency is the unique,
pure-strategy perfect equilibrium when the market’s beliefs off the
equilibrium path are restricted to be rational.
With an endogenous regime, cases may arise (on or off the equi-
librium path) in which some central bank types choose transparency
and others opacity. Following the intuition in section 3.3, it is an
educated guess that such outcomes feature a threshold τ˜ such that
central banks with τ < τ˜ (τ > τ˜) prefer transparency (opacity). This
conjecture is shown to be correct below. More precisely, ET0 [U |τ˜ ] =
EO0 [U |τ˜ ], and ET0 [τ ] = E [τ |τ < τ˜ ]whereas EO0 [τ ] = E [τ |τ > τ˜ ]. The
threshold does not affect the updating under transparency since the
inflation target τ can be inferred perfectly. However, the linear up-
dating rule (20) no longer applies under opacity because τ has a
truncated normal distribution. Let φ (.) denote the probability den-
sity function of the standard normal distribution and Φ (.) the corre-
sponding cumulative density function. Then the updating equation
under opacity has the expression familiar from truncated regres-
sion:
EO1 [τ |i1] = E [τ |X, τ > τ˜ ] = Xξ + σ
φ
³
τ˜−Xξ
σ
´
1− Φ
³
τ˜−Xξ
σ
´,
where X = [1, i1], ξ =
h
E [τ ]− Cov{τ ,i1}Var[i1] E [i1] ,
Cov{τ ,i1}
Var[i1]
i0
and σ2 =
Var [τ |i1] = Var [τ ] − (Cov{τ ,i1})
2
Var[i1]
. Hence, the updating coefficient
under opacity equals
vO (τ˜) ≡ ∂ E [τ |i1, τ > τ˜ ]
∂i1
=
Cov {τ , i1}
Var [i1]
Ã
1− ∂
∂z
φ (z)
1− Φ (z)
¯¯¯¯
z= τ˜−Xξσ
!
.
Using (10) this reduces to vO (τ˜) = −
µ
1− ∂∂z
φ(z)
1−Φ(z)
¯¯¯
z= τ˜−Xξσ
¶
λ ≡
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−λ (τ˜). Since φ(z)1−Φ(z) is convex in z,
20 with a horizontal asymptote
of 0 as z → −∞ and an asymptote of z as z → ∞, it follows that
0 < ∂∂z
φ(z)
1−Φ(z) < 1 and 0 < λ (τ˜) < λ < 1. The existence of a
threshold makes inflation expectations less sensitive to the interest
rate under opacity, because there is relatively less uncertainty
about the inflation target. Note that limτ˜→−∞ λ (τ˜) = λ, which
corresponds to opacity under the exogenous regime in section 3.2.
To obtain the opacity outcome in threshold cases, simply substitute
λ (τ˜) for λ.21 This means that for a threshold τ˜ , the central bank’s
expected payoff can be written as
ER0 [U |τ ; τ˜ ] = AR (τ˜)
³
τ − ER0 [τ ; τ˜ ]
´
+BR (τ˜) , (27)
where AR and BR follow from (19) and (26), so
AT = β
AO (τ˜) = (1 + [1− λ (τ˜)] δ)β
BT = −
h
(1− δ)2 + δ
i 1
2
β2
BO (τ˜) = −
h
(1− λ (τ˜) δ)2 + δ
i 1
2
β2.
Notice that 0 < AT < AO and BO < BT < 0 for any τ˜ . It
follows that ET0 [U |τ ; τ˜ ] and EO0 [U |τ ; τ˜ ] are increasing in τ with
slopes AT and AO, respectively. As a result, if there exists a
threshold τ˜ such that ET0 [U |τ˜ ; τ˜ ] = EO0 [U |τ˜ ; τ˜ ], then the central
bank prefers a regime of transparency (opacity) for τ < τ˜ (τ >
τ˜), and rational expectations imply that ET0 [τ ] = E [τ |τ < τ˜ ] and
EO0 [τ ] = E [τ |τ > τ˜ ]. Using (27) it is straightforward to show
that the normalized threshold inflation target z˜ ≡ (τ˜ − τ¯) /στ must
20For a proof that f (z) ≡ φ(z)1−Φ(z) is convex, see Sampford (1953). As a corollary,
f (−z) = φ(z)Φ(z) is also convex.
21Note that λ (τ˜) implicitly depends on i1, so (23) no longer provides a closed-form solution
for iO1 . Although a solution for iO1 always exists, it may not be unique. However, the remainder
holds for any solution defined by (23).
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satisfy22
z˜ =
AO (τ˜)
AO (τ˜)−AT
φ (z˜)
1− Φ (z˜) +
AT
AO (τ˜)−AT
φ (z˜)
Φ (z˜) +
BT −BO (τ˜)
AO (τ˜)−AT
1
στ
.
(28)
The proof that transparency is the unique, pure-strategy perfect
equilibrium when the market’s beliefs off the equilibrium path are
restricted to be rational, proceeds in three steps. First, it is shown
that there exists no threshold equilibrium in which some central
banks decide to adopt transparency and some opacity. Second, it
appears that opacity cannot be an equilibrium because central banks
with low inflation targets prefer to deviate. Third, it is verified that
transparency is indeed an equilibrium.
(I) Suppose that there is a threshold equilibrium such that a cen-
tral bank with inflation target τ˜ is indifferent between transparency
and opacity. Then the normalized threshold z˜ (if any) satisfies (28).
This equation has the structure z˜ = C1 φ(z˜)1−Φ(z˜) + C2
φ(z˜)
Φ(z˜) + C3 where
C1 > 1, C2 > 0 and C3 > 0 for any τ˜ ; in addition, C1, C2, and C3
are continuous in τ˜ , with finite limits as τ˜ → ±∞. Momentarily
treating z˜ and τ˜ as independent variables, C1 φ(z˜)1−Φ(z˜) + C2
φ(z˜)
Φ(z˜) + C3
is strictly positive and convex in z˜ as φ/Φ and φ/ (1− Φ) are con-
vex. Furthermore, C1 φ(z˜)1−Φ(z˜) + C2
φ(z˜)
Φ(z˜) has an asymptote of −C2z˜ as
z˜ →−∞ and C1z˜ as z˜ →∞. So, z˜ < C1 φ(z˜)1−Φ(z˜)+C2
φ(z˜)
Φ(z˜)+C3 for any
z˜ and τ˜ , including τ˜ = στ z˜ + τ¯ . Hence, the right-hand side of (28)
is strictly greater than z˜ for any z˜. This means that no threshold
equilibrium exists.
(II) Now, suppose that opacity is a perfect equilibrium, so
EO0 [τ ] = τ¯ . Consider whether there exists a threshold τ˜ such
that a central bank is indifferent between opacity and deviating to
transparency. Rational expectations imply that ET0 [τ ] = E [τ |τ < τ˜ ].
Then, the first term on the right-hand side of (28) vanishes, so that
22Recall that τ ∼ N
¡
τ¯ ,σ2τ
¢
, so that E [τ |τ < τ˜ ] = τ¯ − στφ
³
τ˜−τ¯
στ
´
/Φ
³
τ˜−τ¯
στ
´
and
E [τ |τ > τ˜ ] = τ¯ + στφ
³
τ˜−τ¯
στ
´
/
h
1−Φ
³
τ˜−τ¯
στ
´i
.
26
it takes the form z˜ = C2 φ(z˜)Φ(z˜) + C3. Note that C2
φ(z˜)
Φ(z˜) is decreasing
and convex in z˜, with an asymptote of −C2z˜ as z˜ → −∞ and 0 as
z˜ →∞. So, for any τ˜ , including τ˜ = στ z˜ + τ¯ , there exists a finite z˜
such that z˜ = C2 φ(z˜)Φ(z˜) + C3. This implies that a threshold τ˜ exists so
that opacity cannot be a perfect e quilibrium.
(III) Finally, suppose that transparency is a perfect equilibrium,
so ET0 [τ ] = τ¯ . Consider whether there exists a threshold τ˜ such that
a central bank is indifferent between transparency and deviating to
opacity. Rational expectations imply EO0 [τ ] = E [τ |τ > τ˜ ]. Then,
the second term on the right-hand side of (28) vanishes, so that it
takes the form z˜ = C1 φ(z˜)1−Φ(z˜) + C3. Note that C1
φ(z˜)
1−Φ(z˜) is increasing
and convex in z˜, with an asymptote of 0 as z˜ → −∞ and C1z˜
as z˜ → ∞. So, z˜ < C1 φ(z˜)1−Φ(z˜) + C3 for any z˜ and τ˜ , including
τ˜ = στ z˜ + τ¯ . This implies that there exists no threshold τ˜ such that
deviation from transparency is preferred. Therefore, transparency
is the unique, pure-strategy perfect equilibrium.23
Note that this conclusion holds regardless of the degree of
opacity, which depends negatively on λ, with λ = 1 amounting
to the transparency case. So, transparency is the equilibrium even
when the central bank has the opportunity to choose an opacity
regime with λ arbitrarily close to one.
23Without the restriction that beliefs off the equilibrium path (EO0 [τ ]) are rational, trans-
parency would not be a perfect equilibrium because there would always exist types with suf-
ficiently large τ that prefer to deviate. This is a consequence of the unbounded support of the
distribution of τ .
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